Sacrificing their Careers for their Families? An Analysis of the Family Pay Penalty in Europe by Gash, V.
Gash, V. (2009). Sacrificing their Careers for their Families? An Analysis of the Family Pay Penalty 
in Europe. Social Indicators Research, 93(3), pp. 569-586. doi: 10.1007/s11205-008-9429-y 
City Research Online
Original citation: Gash, V. (2009). Sacrificing their Careers for their Families? An Analysis of the 
Family Pay Penalty in Europe. Social Indicators Research, 93(3), pp. 569-586. doi: 
10.1007/s11205-008-9429-y 
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/5404/
 
Copyright & reuse
City University London has developed City Research Online so that its users may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders.  All material in City Research 
Online is checked for eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs 
from City Research Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised 
to check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact 
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
 1 
Sacrificing their Careers for their Families? An Analysis of the Penalty to 
Motherhood in Europe. 
 
Vanessa Gash, University of Manchester 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines the extent of and the mechanisms behind the penalty to motherhood in six 
European countries. Each country provides different levels of support for maternal employment allowing us 
to determine institutional effects on labour market outcome. While mothers tend to earn less than non-
mothers, the penalty to motherhood is considerably lower in countries with policy support for working 
mothers. The paper establishes the United Kingdom and West Germany to have the least policy support for 
working mothers as well as the largest penalties to motherhood.  
 
Keywords: wages, maternal employment, cross-national analysis. 
JEL: J16, J31. 
 
1. Introduction 
There is a long tradition of analysis into the penalty to motherhood (e.g. Waldfogel 1997; 
Budig and England 2001). Early work, primarily on American and British data, 
established a penalty to motherhood that was robust to alternative specifications (e.g. 
Waldfogel 1997; Joshi and Paci and Waldfogel 1999). More recent analyses have 
examined whether mothers are similarly exposed to pay penalties across countries 
including Europe (e.g. Harkness and Waldfogel 2003; Davis and Pierre 2005). While 
these studies also find mothers to earn less than non-mothers, the penalty to motherhood 
is less consistent in continental Europe than in America and the United-Kingdom.  
 
Why is it that mothers earn less than non-mothers? The penalty to motherhood is 
attributed to a range of factors. First, motherhood can be difficult to combine with paid 
employment impinging on working mothers’ labour force attachment (e.g. Del Boca and 
Wetzels 2007). If mothers take time out of employment, we can expect earning 
differentials to arise from; lower work experience, possible skill attrition and other 
penalties for non-market engagement. Moreover, if mothers ‘trade down’ to part-time 
jobs in pursuit of work-life balance they are often required to take posts of lower 
occupational worth (Connolly and Gregory 2008) which pay less. Second, there is the 
suggestion that mothers seek employment which allows them to balance both paid work 
and unpaid care and that they accept lower wages in pursuit of these ‘compensating 
differentials’ (Smith 1976). The theory of compensating differentials argues that dis-
amenities in a job’s characteristics will incur a wage premium in a competitive market. 
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Similarly, desired job characteristics, such as job autonomy or provision of work-life 
balance, are effectively ‘bought’ for a lower wage. Third, individual preferences or 
attitudes concerning paid work may influence earnings. Traditional gender ideologies 
which re-enforce women’s specialisation in unpaid care and their marginal role in bread-
winning (Becker 1991) may result in a weak work-orientation and therefore lower 
earnings. Fourth, policies supportive of maternal employment are expected to influence 
the penalty to motherhood. Countries with little policy provision for maternal 
employment, such as the US and the UK, place working-mothers at a disadvantage 
relative to those without care responsibilities (Gash 2008). In a competitive market such 
disadvantage is likely to translate into lower pay.  
 
Previous analyses have often been unable to engage with all the possible mechanisms 
behind mothers’ lower pay. This paper improves on these analyses by assessing how 
individual attributes and attitudes, labour market structures and institutions contribute to 
lower pay. As no single dataset contains all this information, this paper deploys two 
datasets which in combination allow us to examine these divergent features of working 
motherhood. We use the European Social Survey (ESS) a cross-sectional comparative 
dataset which in 2004 collected a module on work-life balance. This module provides us 
with a rich source of data on gender ideology as well as variables that allow us to 
operationalise compensating differentials in employment. We also use the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) a large panel dataset which allows us to determine 
how demographic and labour market structures influence mothers’ earnings. Moreover, 
the panel component of the data also allows us to control for unobserved heterogeneity, 
i.e. unmeasured individual attributes such as attitudes or dispositions to work. As policy 
support for maternal employment is expected to decrease the penalty to motherhood, this 
paper compares the penalty to motherhood in six countries with varying policy support 
for maternal employment. The United Kingdom, West Germanyi and the Netherlands 
provide little policy support for maternal employment; while France, Finland and 
Denmark have a history of support for working mothers.  
 
2. The penalty to motherhood, previous findings 
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Research on micro-level data has attributed a large portion of the penalty to motherhood 
to women’s reduced labour force attachment in and around childbearing and rearing. 
Indeed the ability of researchers to convincingly account for work experience is central to 
much of the published literature on the topic. Waldvogel (1997), using the American 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) (1968-1988), finds a penalty to 
motherhood even after controlling for work experience, working time and unobserved 
heterogeneity. Budig and England (2001), using more recent waves of the NLSY (1982-
1993), confirm the penalty to motherhood. Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel (1999) using UK 
cohort data compared the wages of mothers in 1978 and 1991. They found little 
difference in the gross penalty to motherhood over-time; however they did find 
considerable differences in its composition over-time.  
 
What of more recent analyses on data pertinent to the late 1990s and early 2000s? While 
there is little evidence of a decreased penalty to motherhood using recent American data 
(Avellar and Smock 2003), some European analyses do suggest a shift against the penalty 
to motherhood. Petersen, Penner and Hogsnes (2007) document a strong decrease in the 
penalty to motherhood in Norway. By the end of the 1990s they found mothers and non-
mothers to earn the same wages when they worked in the same establishment. 
Meanwhile, other researchers using European data have found considerably less evidence 
of a penalty to motherhood. Using Danish data covering 1980 to 1995, Datta Gupta and 
Smith (2002), find no penalty to motherhood once unobserved heterogeneity is controlled 
for. Davies and Pierre (2005), using six of the eight waves of the ECHP (1994-1999), 
find a penalty to motherhood in most countries. However, the penalties they find are 
driven by very young mothers, older mothers tend not to earn a penalty. ii  
 
A competing explanation for the penalty to motherhood argues that mothers exchange 
lower wages for ‘mother friendly’ working conditions. The theory of compensating 
differentials suggests that unpleasant job conditions should be compensated for with 
higher wages and pleasant working conditions are purchased through lower pay (Smith, 
1976). This concept is used to explain women’s engagement in low paid part-time work 
and also for their concentration in the less well paid public sector. The suggestion is that 
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mothers (and women intending to become mothers) willingly forego the higher earnings 
of full-time employment in the private sector to obtain less well paid ‘family friendly’ 
employment. Nonetheless, many researchers have since contested the hypothesis of 
compensating differentials noting that markets do not necessarily compensate poor 
working conditions nor charge for pleasant ones. For instance, researchers have found job 
flexibility (a desired job attribute by many) to be associated with a wage premium rather 
than a penalty (e.g. Gariety and Shaffer 2001). There is also little evidence that 
unpleasant job attributes are compensated for by higher wages: job insecurity earns a 
penalty (Gash and McGinnity 2007), even though it is demonstrably a disutility (Gash, 
Mertens and Romeo-Gordo 2007).  
 
Few datasets contain information on job attributes; with many researchers therefore 
unable to discount compensating differentials as an explanatory factor of mothers’ lower 
pay. Still, there are exceptions. In their disaggregation of the sex gap in pay Kilbourne et 
al. (1994) find job attributes and skill levels account for some but not all the pay gap. 
Moreover, they found women earned less if they worked in occupations that were 
typically ‘female’, which Kilbourne et al. attribute to a cultural devaluation of women 
and their work. Glass (2004) examines the effects of work-family reconciliation policies 
on wages and wage growth. Access to work-family reconciliation policies were not found 
to depress workers wages (refuting the neo-classical claim that workers ‘buy’ preferred 
conditions through lower pay). Rather, she found mothers who used policies that 
decreased contact hours earned pay penalties, while mothers who used flexible schedules 
or childcare assistance, policies that maximise mothers’ contact hours, exhibited few to 
no penalties.  
 
Finally, gendered working preferences have been used to explain the persistence of the 
gender gap in pay and in forms of female participation (Fortin 2005). While it is 
conceivable that mothers have reduced preferences for work that are correlated with 
lower pay; increasingly researchers recognize that preferences offer poor causal 
explanations of outcome. In fact, recent research points to the dual causality between 
preferences and outcome, Himmelweit and Sagwala (2005) find preferences to change to 
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reflect outcome. While Berrington et al. (2008), using graphical chain models, establish 
women to be more likely to change their attitudes than pursue market outcomes on the 
basis of their attitudes.  
   
Combined these research findings reveal a history of lower pay for mothers across 
countries; though the primary driver of the penalty remains unclear. Using the latest panel 
data this paper will re-investigate and compare the penalty to motherhood in six 
European countries. In addition to an investigation of mothers’ pay, the empirical 
analysis will reveal whether mothers differ from non-mothers in their market attachment 
and skill set; it will assess whether mothers appear to cluster in occupations with job 
attributes supportive of work-life balance and, therefore, if they appear to pursue 
compensating differentials. While the research reviewed cautions against using attitudinal 
data as a causal account of wages; ideological differentials between mothers and non-
mothers will nonetheless be examined as both a function of as well as a possible 
contributor to mothers’ lower pay. Finally, the role of institutional context as a driver of 
pay penalties is rarely articulated in the literature reviewed but is presented as a pivotal 
explanatory mechanism for mothers’ low pay here. Therefore the policies thought to 
structure the penalty to motherhood are reviewed below.  
 
 
3. Policy support for working-mothers 
Does policy support for maternal employment decrease the penalty to motherhood? The 
policies reviewed are those expected to support working-motherhood and in particular to 
remove barriers to their equal labour force participation. We expect mothers in countries 
with no/little support for maternal employment to earn a penalty relative to non-mothers 
at the mean. We also expect policies supportive of maternal employment to remove 
mothers’ need to pursue compensating differentials concomitant with work-life balance 
in employment. Table 1 provides social indicators of the countries analysed as well as 
indicators of policy provision for maternal/paternal workers. Rather than introduce policy 
variables to the statistical analysis, this paper provides a review of the policy context of 
each country to reveal the different policy environments facing maternal workers. We do 
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not include policy variables in our empirical estimations as we expect multiple policies to 
influence working mothers. Previous research has highlighted the risks of introducing 
multiple variables measuring macro-policy or macro-economic factors in statistical 
estimations (Russell and O’Connell 2001). 
 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
 
Parental leave and benefit- Parental leave schemes allow parents an agreed period of 
leave from their posts, a right to return to the same post and protection from unfair 
dismissal. As with maternity leave, which is not reviewed due to the similitude of 
entitlement across countries, these schemes ensure that the mother, predominantly, can 
maintain her position in the labour market despite taking time off to care for her child. 
Parental leave schemes vary in their duration, and in their benefit provision. Leave 
duration is fairly short in the UK, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands; while it is very 
long in France and Germany. In Denmark and Finland leave provision can be taken as an 
alternative to public childcare, which parents are guaranteed access to. Leave in most 
countries is paid and tends to be lower than maternity leave payments. It is unpaid in the 
UK and the Netherlands. Increasingly, researchers believe short leave periods to be less 
detrimental to a mother’s career. Women on longer leave periods tend to earn less on 
their return (e.g. Datta Gupta and Smith 2001) and are also more likely to drop-out of 
paid employment. This suggests that the shorter paid leave in Finland and Denmark 
should impact positively on mothers’ market engagement, and therefore protect their 
wages. Though the UK and the Netherlands also have short leave arrangements, the leave 
is unpaid. Therefore, mothers in households dependent on their income are more likely to 
return to work in jobs (part-time or flexi-time) that allow them to both earn and care for 
their children rather than take unpaid leave. This situation is likely to exacerbate the 
penalty to motherhood, with many mothers understood to occupationally downgrade in 
pursuit of family friendly employment (Connolly and Gregory 2008).  
 
Childcare- There are numerous childcare policies which can support working-mothers. 
These include: provision of public childcare, subsidies for private childcare use as well as 
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policies ensuring that school-hours are compatible with the average workers’ working 
day (see Neyer 2003 for a discussion). We restrict our attention to public childcare for 
young children as there is more variation across countries in care provision for children 
of these ages. We note that Denmark, Finland and France provide universal access to 
childcare with children guaranteed a place in local childcare services. We expect mothers 
with access to childcare to engage in paid employment under similar conditions to 
workers without children, decreasing the penalty to motherhood in these countries. 
 
Current fertility rates vary considerably by country with countries more supportive of 
working motherhood tending toward higher fertility (Esping-Andersen 1999). Table 1 
confirms this: Finland, Denmark and France have the highest fertility rates and the most 
support for maternal employment. The UK is unusual, however, in its high fertility rates 
and low support for maternal employment. While labour force participation rates for 
women between the ages of 24-50 years are similar for the countries analysed (OECD 
2001), it is worth noting that countries supportive of maternal employment tend to have 
lower proportions of women engaged in part-time employment (table 1). Controls for 
working-time will be vital in the statistical analyses therefore, and already suggest that in 
the absence of policy support for maternal employment mothers pursue compensating 
differentials in employment. Finally, Table 1 presents the mean age at childbearing in 
each country. The mean age of mothers at child-birth(s) is 29-31 years with little 
variation by country. This suggests that the exclusion of younger workers (those aged 24 
and younger), as is common in much labour market research, should not have a strong 
impact on the interpretation of our results.  
 
Expectations of the penalty to motherhood by country 
If mothers are constrained in their market behaviour, as a result of their dual burden of 
paid work and unpaid care, we can expect them to earn a pay penalty. The source of the 
pay penalty may be ‘legitimate’; mothers may be working in jobs of lower occupational 
worth, they may have shorter tenure, they may be in part-time jobs. However, the 
legitimacy bequeathed to labour market outcome needs to be questioned. If mothers work 
part-time and earn a lower wage because they cannot obtain or afford childcare, we have 
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not explained away a problematic wage differential to choice. The strength of a 
comparative analysis, crucially on countries that provide different options to working-
motherhood, lies in its ability to determine whether mothers free to choose different 
market outcomes take those opportunities and display fewer penalties therefore. 
  Finland and Denmark are expected to have the smallest penalties to motherhood. 
Both countries provide extensive public childcare services, allowing mothers to 
outsource childcare while in paid employment. Both countries also provide short 
paid parental leave schemes. Short parental leave reduces periods out of paid 
employment limiting skill attrition whilst maintaining mothers’ previous position 
in the market. Under these conditions mothers are less likely to pursue 
compensating differentials in employment, being able to work standard jobs and 
manage childrearing. 
  France is also expected to have smaller wage penalties relative to countries with 
less support for maternal employment. However, we expect the French regime to 
be less successful at re-integrating mothers back to paid work with its extensive 
three year parental leave likely to encourage labour market drop-out. If French 
women do on average take the full period of their leave entitlements we could 
expect them to earn a penalty on their return to paid employment as a result of 
possible skill attrition or simply lower job tenure.  
  The Netherlands is classified as unsupportive of maternal employment with its 
largely unpaid parental leave (with the exception of the public sector) and its low 
investment in public childcare services. Policy support for maternal employment 
tends to be limited to government support for part-time work (Kenjoh 2005). This 
has resulted in extremely high rates of part-time employment in the Netherlands 
compared with other countries. While provision for maternal employment in the 
Netherlands is, compared with Nordic countries and France, poor, its unusual 
distribution of working hours for all women may result in less difference between 
mothers’ and non-mothers’ earnings.  
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  West Germany and the UK are expected to exhibit the largest penalty to 
motherhood with work-family reconciliation likely to be achieved through pursuit 
of family friendly, and therefore often less well paid, employment. West Germany 
provides little support for working motherhood; rather it supports mothers’ retreat 
from paid employment with its extensive and paid parental leave schemes. 
Moreover, access to affordable childcare services is limited. The UK provides a 
similar environment for working mothers though the UK does not actively 
support mothers retreat from paid employment with parental leave unpaid. Public 
childcare services in the UK are also under-developed and often prohibitively 
expensive when purchased in the private sector (Viitanen 2005). Mothers, 
therefore, are most likely to negotiate working-motherhood by obtaining (often 
poorly paid) part-time work in both these countries.  
 
4. The data and research design 
This paper uses two cross-national datasets. The first data source used is the European 
Social Survey (ESS)iii a multi-country cross-sectional survey. This paper uses the 
information from the round 2 rotating module on ‘Family, Work and Well-being’ which 
was collected in 2004. This module allows us determine whether working mothers’ tend 
to pursue jobs with compensating differentials and whether they differ attitudinally from 
working non-mothers. The second data source is the European Community Household 
Panel Survey (ECHP)iv, a multi-country cross-national panel survey conducted in the 
Member States of the European Union under the auspices of the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities (EUROSTAT). We use the complete panel sequence spanning an 
eight-year period from 1994 to 2001.  
 
The sample selection for the analyses is similar for both datasets. We select on working 
women aged between 25 and 45 years of age. This selection is a common one in the 
literature (e.g. Harkness and Waldfogel 2003) and is applied to ensure we do not attribute 
non-motherhood status to women whose children have left home. It also means that we 
are most likely to observe a penalty to motherhood, as previous analyses have found the 
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penalty to decrease once the mother has returned to continuous employment (i.e. Datta 
Gupta and Smith 2002). For the analysis using the ECHP data we further select on 
women with at least two years of information on wages, we do this to ensure that our 
sample is consistent across our ordinary least squares and fixed effects estimations. The 
variable measuring children is continuous though alterative specifications were tested 
with little effect. There is no consensus in the literature which the best measure of 
children on wages is, though others have measured the effect of children in this manner 
(i.e. Harkness and Waldfogel 2003).  
 
Using the ESS data we are able to identify whether job attributes could be operationalised 
as compensating differentials and therefore used as explanations of lower pay. The first 
variable can be understood as an undisclosed compensating differential in the strictest 
sense. It allows us to determine whether the respondent values their current job more 
highly than another with higher pay. The questionnaire asks: would [you]  turn down another 
job with higher pay in order to stay with this organization (1-5 point scale varying from agree strongly to 
disagree strongly). If mothers are more likely to agree with this statement we would have 
good cause to conclude that mothers do pursue less well paid employment that provides 
them with (undisclosed) compensating differentials. The second group of variables 
measure job attributes which could be understood to provide work-life balance for 
working mothers. We can imagine the coordination of childcare arrangements might be 
facilitated by greater job autonomy and may therefore be actively pursued by mothers 
and ‘purchased’ through a lower wage. Job autonomy was determined by asking 
respondents whether they were able to ‘decide how your own daily work is/was organised?’, and 
also whether they can ‘chose or change their pace of work?’. Both questions vary from 0-10 
with 10 being equal to complete control and 0 having none and have an alpha cronbach of 
0.7. A second group of questions asked if the worker worked unusual hours, hours which 
might be deemed incompatible with balancing work with the care of children. The precise 
questions asked are: How often does your work involve (a) working evenings or nights? 
(b) having to work overtime at short notice? and (c) working at weekends? There are 
seven possible categories ranging from never (1) to everyday (7). Again these variables 
were highly correlated legitimating the combined variable. We also examine whether 
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mothers hold more traditional gender ideologies which may result in a weaker work 
orientation and therefore lower pay. Respondents who agreed that: ‘women should cut 
down on paid work for the sake of the family’, that ‘men should have more right to a job 
than women when jobs are scarce’ and that ‘men should not take equal responsibility for 
home and children’, were classified as having a traditional gender ideology. The 
combined variable only used variables that could equally apply to mothers and non-
mothers. We therefore exclude responses to the question: ‘if there are children in the 
home partners should stay together even if they don't get along’, as the prescription of 
this value does not apply to non-mothers.  
 
The research design of the paper is the following. We start by examining the predictors of 
working-motherhood to determine whether mothers are found in similar jobs as women 
without children. This analysis is followed by an examination of the penalty to 
motherhood using the ECHP. The ESS data did not allow multivariate wage regressions 
on our sub-sample of working mothers with very high missing rates on wages 
exacerbating small cell-size.  
 
The wage analysis includes pooled ordinary least squares and fixed effects models (a 
common modeling strategy in the literature). Pooled ordinary least squares models 
maximise on sample size by increasing the sampling pool of workers analysed, with 
workers with intermittent periods of employment more likely to be captured in the data 
over time than if one year of the panel was used. This is expected to be particularly 
beneficial to our analysis, given the risk of sample selection bias for women with 
intermittent employment (Blau 1991; Gorgens 2002). While this paper does not control 
for sample selection, Heckman selection models were run on the final pooled OLS 
regressions to test whether the parameter estimations adequately reflect observed wages. 
Only two countries showed evidence of sample selection bias, the UK and West 
Germany. Moreover, the impact of the wage adjustments were minimal with a penalty to 
motherhood remaining in both cases. The fixed-effects specification is also useful as it 
allows us to assess the mean effect of key covariates on wages as well as allowing us to 
remove time constant unobserved heterogeneity. This specification engages with one 
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hypothesis for the penalty to motherhood: that mothers’ low pay may reflect an 
unobserved characteristic such as weak work orientation. Nonetheless such a 
specification cannot account for time varying unobservables, with the suggestion that 
motherhood may bring about changes in attitudes towards employment. It is also 
inadequate for estimations of time constant variables (Wooldridge 2000). Despite these 
limitations Hausman (1978) tests revealed the fixed effects specification to be superior to 
a random effects specification.  
 
The paper concludes with a series of tests using the ESS data. It reveals whether mothers 
appear to pursue compensating differentials in employment and whether mothers differ 
attitudinally from women without children.  
 
The means and proportions for both samples are presented in the appendix (appendix 
website: www.esri.ie). Both datasets tell a similar story within countries. Countries with 
poor support for maternal employment have considerably higher proportions of mothers 
working in part-time work (i.e. West-Germany, the Netherlands and the United-
Kingdom). There is also a slight tendency across countries for working-mothers to have 
fewer third level qualifications than non-mothers. There are some differences in our sub-
samples of working women, with non-mothers having higher mean ages than mothers in 
the ESS data. Alternative methods of measuring motherhood did not alter this finding. 
The other notable difference between both data is found in the ESS German sample 
where we find non-mothers to be more likely to work part-time. This finding is robust to 
alternative specifications of motherhood. As this finding is counterintuitive and contrary 
to other published data (Eurostat 2005), we interpret the German ESS data with caution.  
  
5. Where do mothers work and what do they earn?  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
Table 2 presents the predictors of working motherhood, an important precursor to an 
analysis of wages. Overall we find working-mothers to have a different, and often 
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inferior, labour market profile to non-mothers. The most dramatic cross-national 
difference is found in the relative risks of working part-time hours. While mothers in 
each country are more likely to work part-time, with the exception of Finland, they are 
six to eight times more likely to do so in countries with low support for maternal 
employment. Working mothers are also less likely to work in highly skilled occupations 
in all countries, with the exception of Denmark. This tendency is most pronounced in the 
higher professional occupations, though in West Germany and the Netherlands, two 
countries with strong breadwinner ideologies, working mothers are also less likely to 
work in lower professional and clerical occupations. Finally, mothers in countries 
unsupportive of working-motherhood have shorter job tenure than non-mothers (with the 
exception of the Netherlands). There is no similar tendency in countries supportive of 
working-motherhood. Further tests, not shown, also revealed a tendency for working-
mothers to have slightly lower educational levels suggesting that higher skilled mothers 
are also not returning to work (rather than just downgrading to lower skilled jobs). The 
lower educational levels of working mothers were found in each country save for Finland 
and Denmark. It was not possible, however, to estimate educational level and 
occupational status concurrently as they appeared to be collinear (though these results are 
available from the author on request). Nonetheless, when both were included the 
tendency did remain: with the exception of Denmark, working mothers are less likely to 
be in positions of high skill relative to non-mothers. We do not know, however, whether 
this is due to the incompatibility of professional posts with motherhood or due to higher 
skilled mothers choosing to leave paid employment. These findings could also be related 
to delayed and declining fertility among highly educated women (Nicoletti and Tanturri 
2005). It is most likely, however, to be a combination of these effects.  
 
<Table 3 about here > 
 
Table 3 presents a series of estimations of the penalty to motherhood for each national 
sample. This paper seeks to establish whether countries that are supportive of motherhood 
appear to have lower penalties to motherhood. Equation one presents the gross penalty to 
motherhood. We find mothers in West Germany and the UK earn less than non-mothers. 
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In the Netherlands we find evidence of a gross premium. Countries supportive of 
maternal employment have no gross penalties to motherhood. Some of this effect, 
however, might be due to the younger age profile of non-mothers and therefore their 
lower work experience (see the appendix www.esri.ie). In equation two we add key 
predictors of low pay to the model such as occupational level and work experience. 
Additional controls are also included, see notes to table 3. Once the considerable 
heterogeneity between working mothers and working non-mothers is controlled for we 
still find mothers to earn less in all countries (though the penalty is only significant at the 
.10 level in Finland). We also note that the size of the penalty is the greatest in the UK 
and West Germany two countries with poor support for working motherhood. The 
Netherlands, however, appears to have less of a penalty than France, which is contrary to 
expectation given French social policies supportive of maternal employment.  
 
While working-hours are controlled for in equation two, the other covariates in the model 
may operate differently for part-time workers, with part-time work often clustered in low 
paid market segments (O’Connell and Gash 2000). For this reason equation three selects 
on full-time workers only, allowing us to focus on working-mothers in full-time jobs. 
This restriction results in an increased penalty to motherhood in many countries; once 
full-time non-mothers are the reference category the penalty increases. The UK exhibits 
the largest change with mothers in full-time employment clearly earning higher penalties 
per hour when compared with non-mothers in similar posts. Restricting the analysis to 
full-time workers removed the penalty to motherhood in the Netherlands; Dutch mothers 
effectively earn less because they work part-time. However, given that 74% of our Dutch 
maternal sample works part-time (Table A1 in the appendix) this result is pertinent to a 
very small proportion of its population. Equation four presents the same specification as 
equation three, though it is specified with fixed-effects which remove time constant 
variance from the model. When both observed and unobserved constants are removed 
from the model the impact of motherhood is no longer significant for full-time workers. 
To interpret this surprising result we need to remember that the coefficient estimate of 
motherhood in the fixed-effects model is the mean effect of changes in motherhood over 
time. Therefore, motherhood in this estimation measures the mean effect of being a new 
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mother or a mother with children who have left the home. Women who are never 
mothers, for instance, are removed from this estimate.  
 
A further two tests are presented. We measure motherhood as a continuous variable, yet 
previous research has found a tendency for a differentiated penalty according to the 
number of children had (e.g. Harkness and Waldfogel 2003; Davies and Pierre 2005)v 
Equation five reveals the penalty for women with two or more children specifically. We 
find the supplementary penalty for multiple children holds true for West Germany and the 
UK. Equation six presents a similar specification as equation five, though it is specified 
with fixed-effects. Equation six reveals a penalty for changes in motherhood for mothers 
of more than one child in West-Germany and the UK. We also find that fixed-effects 
increased the penalty in Finland (though only at the .10 level).  
 
Fixed-effects models should in principle provide us with a clearer picture of the penalty 
to motherhood once time constant unobserved individual attributes, such as work 
orientation or attitudes are removed from the estimates. However, we can at best guess 
which individual attributes are being removed from the model. A crucial component of 




6. Compensating Differentials and Gender Ideology 
 
<Table 4 about here> 
 
 
Table four presents a series of analyses that offer alternative, and crucially revealed, 
explanations of the penalty to motherhood identifying whether mothers differ from non-
mothers in their forms of employment and attitudinally, variables not available in the 
ECHP. The first series of variables measure, in different ways, whether mothers appear to 
have jobs with compensating differentials that may be exchanged for lower wages. Our 
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most robust measure of compensating differentials asks respondents whether they value 
their current job more highly than another with higher pay. If mothers obtain 
compensating differentials in employment, we would expect them to remain in lower 
paid jobs. We find little evidence that mothers choose to remain in less well paid jobs, 
relative to non-mothers. The one exception, where mothers do appear to choose to remain 
in lower paid jobs, is the UK. This confirms our expectation; with mothers in the UK 
most likely to pursue compensating differentials in employment given the absence of 
policy support for maternal employment there. Table 4 also reveals whether mothers are 
more likely to hold jobs with attributes associated with work-life balance. We 
hypothesize, though cannot prove, that these attributes may be exchanged for lower pay. 
The first attribute analysed is job autonomy, which is likely to facilitate work-life balance 
and may, therefore, be pursued by working-mothers. We find a tendency in each country 
for mothers to have slightly more job autonomy than non-mothers. However, the effect is 
only significantly different in Denmark. The second, and final, job attribute assessed was 
unsocial working-hours which were expected to render childcare considerably more 
difficult. The variable determines the frequency which workers worked: evenings, 
weekends and overtime at short notice. Mothers are less likely to work unsocial hours in 
general, though the statistical significance of the difference only holds for West-
Germany, the UK and Denmark. While we expected mothers in West-Germany and the 
UK to pursue job attributes that facilitate work-life balance in employment; we did not 
expect it of Denmark. Additional tests (not shown) were conducted to determine whether 
these bivariate relationships remained significant in multivariate analyses that controlled 
for demographic and labour market characteristics. Unfortunately, none of them did, 
though this is partially a result of the incredibly small sample sizes available.vi With the 
excepetion of the UK, the ESS data established little tendency for mothers to be in receipt 
of compensating differentials that could be attributed to their lower wages. Finally, table 
4 examines whether mothers receipt of lower pay may be a function of their weak work-
orientation and traditional gender ideology. As gender traditionalism is equated with 
lower pay (see Polavieja this volume) there is the possibility that some of the penalty to 
motherhood found using the ECHP data could be a function of beliefs. The ESS data 
suggests that mothers are no different to non-mothers in their gender ideologies within 
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countries. It is worth noting; nonetheless, that Nordic countries do have more egalitarian 
gender ideologies than is true of other countries and that the UK appears to be the least 
egalitarian. In total, the ESS data did not provide us with strong evidence that mothers 
vary in either their receipt of compensating differentials in employment or in their gender 
ideology. Nonetheless, on our most robust measure of compensating differentials we do 
establish a bivariate relationship between motherhood and willingness to remain in a job 
with lower pay in the UK.  
 
7. Discussion  
This paper sought to assess whether mothers earn less than non-mothers across countries 
and if so why. It engaged with a large body of research that has consistently found 
evidence of a pay penalty for motherhood but which has also predominantly researched 
countries with minimal policy support for maternal employment (e.g. the USA, the UK 
and Germany). By comparing countries with and without policy support for working-
motherhood; this paper was able to reveal whether mothers supported by policy displayed 
fewer penalties. This paper found mothers to earn less than non-mothers and found 
mothers to earn greater pay penalties in countries unsupportive of working-motherhood.  
 
The paper presented a range of competing explanations for the penalty to motherhood. At 
the micro-level these included mothers’ decreased attachment to paid employment, 
mothers’ pursuit of job conditions concomitant with work-life balance as well as 
mothers’ work-orientation. At the macro-level policy support for working-motherhood 
was presented as an explanatory factor in mothers’ pay.  
 
Working mothers were found to occupy different market segments within each country. 
Though all mothers (with the exception of those in Finland) were considerably more 
likely to work part-time; countries unsupportive of working motherhood displayed the 
greatest risks. In West-Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, mothers were six to eight 
times more likely to work part-time. Mothers also had reduced likelihoods of being 
employed in the skilled professions in all countries save for Denmark. It was not clear, 
however, whether this is due to the ongoing incompatibility of motherhood with 
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professional posts or due to higher skilled mothers choosing to leave paid employment. 
Finally, mothers in countries unsupportive of working motherhood displayed weaker 
market attachment relative to non-mothers; with mothers having significantly lower job 
tenure. In total the analysis revealed mothers to hold disadvantageous market positions 
likely to account for their low pay. However, mothers in countries supportive of maternal 
employment (and thereby more able to freely choose market outcome) were considerably 
less likely to occupy disadvantaged market segments relative to mothers in countries 
without such policies.  
 
The analysis of the penalty to motherhood found the greatest penalties in two of the three 
countries unsupportive of maternal employment: West-Germany and the UK. The penalty 
was the largest in these countries and the most robust to alternative specifications. 
Countries supportive of maternal employment, as predicted, had much lower penalties. 
Finland had virtually no penalty to motherhood, while the penalty to motherhood was the 
smallest in Denmark. French mothers, however, did earn a penalty despite their access to 
publicly funded childcare. Fixed-effects specifications controlled for both observed and 
unobserved individual heterogeneity; changes in motherhood status were found to have 
little effect on wages for mothers working full-time; though the effect was negative and 
significant in West-Germany and the UK for mothers of more than one child. While the 
fixed effects specification offers an interesting transformation of the penalty to 
motherhood it offers little insight into what unobserved heterogeneity might measure. 
The ESS data was deployed to examine what the potential sources of unobserved 
heterogeneity between working-mothers and non-mothers could be. In general, the ESS 
data established little tendency for mothers to be in receipt of compensating differentials 
that could explain their lower wages. Nonetheless, mothers in the UK were found to 
accept lower pay for compensating differentials in employment. This finding confirmed 
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our expectation that lack of public provision for maternal employment might result in 
mothers accepting lower pay in pursuit of work-life balance. However, the tendency for 
mothers to be in receipt of job attributes concomitant with work-life balance did not 
remain in multivariate analyses. The final tests sought to uncover whether mothers 
differed attitudinally. There was no tendency for mothers to be less egalitarian than non-
mothers, though Nordic women were in general more egalitarian. Finally, this paper was 
unable to assess whether mothers were discriminated against by employers, with maternal 
profiling recognised as a problem by American researchers (Correll, Benard and Paik 
2007).  It was also unable to empirically test whether the job attributes concomitant with 
work-life balance were associated with lower pay. Therefore, it would appear safe to 
conclude that research into the penalty to motherhood will continue until all the drivers of 
the penalty can be adequately measured. Until then, it is hoped, that future research will 
also seek to assess how macro-level variables invariably impinge on micro-level 
outcome. For here the role of institutional context was found to structure the forms of 
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Employment Parental Leave Duration P. Leave Benefit 
Guaranteed access 





Mean Age at 
Childbearing 
(years) 
Part-time as prop 




High 26 weeks 
43-82, flat rate plus 




13 weeks both parents + 
10 weeks 1 parent flat rate yes 1.78 30.14 24.3 
FRANCE 
 
High 3 years 
flat rate if more than one 
child yes (2 yrs+) 1.94 29.55 23.6 
GERMANY 
 
Low 3 years 
flat rate for 24 months, 








Low 13 weeks unpaid no 1.77 28.96 40.4 
Notes: The indicators on policy provision are taken from Neyer (2003) and OECD (2001). The policies are relevant to the late 1990s and the early 2000s. 
The fertility rates and mean age at childbearing are from EUROSTAT and refer to 2004. The employment statistics are from OECD Employment Outlook, 
and also refer to 2004.  
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Table 2. Predictors of Working Motherhood. Logistic Regression of the probability of working-motherhood relative to working non-motherhood. 
ECHP Data. Coefficients presented as Odds Ratios. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. 
 





Part-time 0.958 1.597** 1.449* 6.072*** 6.200*** 8.236*** 
 
(0.204) (0.272) (0.217) (0.832) (0.656) (1.049) 
Higher Professional Occupation 0.440** 0.816 0.571* 0.284*** 0.792 0.551** 
 (0.131) (0.211) (0.156) (0.073) (0.189) (0.099) 
Lower Professional Occupation 0.595~ 1.192 0.850 0.415*** 0.655* 0.763 
 (0.178) (0.274) (0.189) (0.084) (0.140) (0.146) 
Clerical (Ref. Skilled and Unskilled Manual) 0.690 1.066 0.874 0.459*** 0.641* 0.902 
 
(0.190) (0.229) (0.177) (0.088) (0.147) (0.150) 
Tenure in current job 1.020 1.039* 1.005 0.959* 0.988 0.963* 
  (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
 
Key: *** p<=.0001; **p<=.001; * p<=.05; ~ p<=.01. Notes: Each model also controls for: age and its square, years in paid work, marital status, panel year, industrial sector 





Table 3. Gross and Net Effects of Motherhood on Logged Hourly Pay. Using all waves of the ECHP (1994-2001). Selecting on: All Employees, 
Women aged between 25 and 45 years of age with a minimum of two years of information on wages and complete information on key covariates. 
Each Model estimation is run on the same sample for each country. Robust Standard Errors are in parentheses. Children Measured as a 
Continuous variable unless specified otherwise. 
 
Key: *** p<=.0001; **p<=.001; * p<=.05; ~ p<=.01 The net penalty to motherhood controls for: age and its square, occupational level, education, years in paid work,, 













EQ1. Gross Penalty to Motherhood 0.013 0.000 0.004 -0.028* 0.017* -0.038** 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.014) (0.014) (0.009) (0.012) 
EQ2. Net Penalty (with controls)  -0.013~ -0.016* -0.030* -0.041** -0.017* -0.042*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010) 
EQ3. Net Penalty, Full-time Workers Only -0.024 -0.016* -0.036* -0.044* -0.013 -0.058*** 
 (0.021) (0.006) (0.013) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) 
EQ4. Net Penalty, Full-time Workers Only, Fixed effects -0.029 -0.004 -0.013 -0.0145 -0.008 -0.017 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.024) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
EQ5. Net Penalty for Two or More Children -0.024 -0.027 -0.032 -0.086* -0.025 -0.070** 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.022) (0.033) (0.020) (0.024) 
EQ6. Net Penalty for Two or More Children, Fixed Effects -0.028~ 0.002 0.006 -0.079** 0.020 -0.062*** 




Table 4. Receipt of Compensating Differentials and Variation in Gender Ideology. Mean differences between mothers relative to non-mothers. 
ESS data (2004). Selecting on: Women aged between 24 and 45 years, with complete information on key covariates.  
  FINLAND   DENMARK   FRANCE   
West 
GERMANY   NETHERLANDS   UK   
Would turn down a job with higher pay (mothers)  2.48 2.94 2.44 3.03 2.67 2.90 
Would turn down a job higher pay (non-mothers) 2.52 2.86 2.59 2.94 2.83 2.51 
 




Can decide work organisation and pace of work (mothers) 15.01 15.32 13.18 13.57 14.09 13.73 
Can decide work organisation and pace of work (non-mothers) 14.80 14.41 12.42 12.87 13.68 12.61 
       
Unsocial Working Hours (mothers) 8.28 7.58 6.98 7.02 6.75 6.96 
Unsocial Working Hours (non-mothers) 8.55 8.49 7.44 7.84 7.12 8.24 
       
Egalitarian Gender Ideology (mothers) 12.10 12.54 11.19 11.09 11.59 10.93 
Egalitarian Gender Ideology  (non-mothers) 12.38 12.47 11.56 11.20 11.56 10.90 
Notes: Means in bold are significantly different at the .05 level. Higher values denote increased tendencies, i.e. mothers in the UK are more likely to turn down a job with 






                                                 
i
 The statistical analyses are restricted to West Germany given the ongoing differences in the labour 
market performance of East and West Germany.  
ii
 It should be noted that Davies and Pierre’s analysis of ‘old’ mothers is likely to be more typical of 
the ‘average’ mother, with the mean age of mothers at (all) birth(s) varying between 28.9 years and 
30.8 years (table 1). 
iii
 Further information can be found at: http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
iv
 Further information can be found at:  
http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/echpanel/info/data/information.html 
v
 Davis and Pierre (2005) found German and British mothers, who were aged 25 years or over at the 
age of birth, had greater penalties when they had more than one child. Harkness and Waldfogel (2003) 
found a similar dynamic in Germany, the UK and Finland.  
vi
 These models controlled for occupational level, working hours, marital status, educational level, work 
experience and age.   
